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Abstract
When making comparisons, people tend to use routinized standards, rules,
and knowledge structures. Compensatory rules (e.g., “if competent, then
cold”, “if incompetent, then warm”) allow for the quick and easy evalua-
tion of groups when they are compared. We claim that the application of
these rules is especially attractive for people who are motivated to seek
quick and firm answers (people high in the need for closure—NFC). How-
ever, we assume that when people are confronted with expectancy-incon-
sistent information, higher levels of NFC lead to a lower reliance on these
rules. This is because the inconsistency may serve as a signal that the rules
no longer provide guidance on how to act. We demonstrated these effects
in three studies set in different group contexts, where we manipulated
expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information. These
findings allow for a more comprehensive view of the dynamic and diverse
effects of NFC.
One important assumption of the lay epistemic theory
(Kruglanski, 1989) is that social knowledge is formu-
lated and applied through the use of “if, then” inferen-
tial rules, and that social judgments, as any judgments,
are made through reasoning from premises to conclu-
sions. The reasoning is syllogistic and includes a major
premise (“if X, then Y”) and a minor premise that pro-
vides evidence that the major premise applies to a
given case (“Z is X” thus “Z is Y”) (Kruglanski, Dech-
esne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009; Kruglanski, Pierro, Man-
netti, Erb, & Chun, 2007; Kruglanski & Shteynberg,
2012). For example, such reasoning can be seen in the
belief that “if mother, then warm” (major premise),
paired with the belief that because a given woman has
children (minor premise), she must be warm (conclu-
sion). Such knowledge is routinized through practice,
and becomes easily accessible (Kruglanski & Shteyn-
berg, 2012; Neal, Wood, & Quinn, 2006).
Research has shown that when making comparisons
people tend to use such routinized standards, rules,
and knowledge structures (Mussweiler & R€uter, 2003;
R€uter & Mussweiler, 2005) which allows them to save
cognitive resources, to reduce uncertainty (Mussweiler
& Posten, 2011), and at the same time to reach a solu-
tion quickly and accurately (Mussweiler & Epstude,
2009). An example of such rule-based social percep-
tion when making comparisons can be seen in evalua-
tions of two groups on the dimensions of warmth and
competence (e.g., Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Demoulin, & Judd,
2008). In that situation, when people perceive one
group as being higher on one dimension (e.g., compe-
tence), they tend to compensate and perceive the other
group as being higher on the other dimension (e.g.,
warmth). This effect can be explained as an application
of simple rules (“if competent, then cold” or “if incom-
petent, then warm”). Such rules can be used with min-
imum cognitive resources and may be easily applied in
many different contexts and situations; thus they may
help to efficiently organize social perception.
A considerable amount of research has shown that
the need for closure (NFC), defined as a feeling of dis-
comfort experienced in the face of cognitive uncer-
tainty (Kruglanski, 1989), motivates people to use
routinized standards, rules, and knowledge structures
(e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2009). Although previous stud-
ies on NFC have mainly focused on the reliance on
pre-existing knowledge structures in social perception
(e.g., stereotypes, beliefs, social schemas), to date there
has been no study examining rule application. This
article is aimed at filling this gap. We focus on compen-
satory rules, as these rules are seen as cognitive tools
that may efficiently simplify cognition. This is because
compensatory rules (e.g., “if competent, then cold”, “if
incompetent, then warm”) allow for the quick and
easy evaluation of groups when they are compared.
Information about a group on one dimension allows
for inferences to be made about the group on the other
important dimension (e.g., information that the group
is competent means that the group is also cold). We
claim that the application of such rules is especially
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attractive for people who are motivated to seek quick
and firm answers (such as individuals high in NFC)
and that they are less attractive for people who prefer
to process information more exhaustively (individuals
low in NFC). Therefore, when forming impressions of
groups in comparative contexts, individuals high in
NFC should apply compensatory rules to a greater
extent than would those low in NFC. However, the
question arises whether this is always the case.
Expectancy-Inconsistent Information, the
Application of Compensatory Rules, and the
Need for Closure
The application of previously learned standards, rules,
and knowledge can serve as a heuristic for evaluating
social objects, which is usually attractive for people
who are high (vs. low) in NFC (Driscoll, Hamilton, &
Sorrentino, 1991; Kruglanski et al., 2009). However,
research has shown that individuals who are high in
NFC sometimes do not rely on pre-existing knowledge
structures, but rather engage in complex, bottom-up
cognition (for an overview, see Roets, Kruglanski,
Kossowska, Pierro, & Hong, 2015). For instance,
higher levels of NFC induced a heightened level of
information processing when initial confidence was
low, as opposed to when initial confidence was high
(Kruglanski, Peri, & Zakai, 1991). Also, Van Hiel and
Mervielde (2002) showed that NFC intensified infor-
mation acquisition when ambiguous information was
included in the judgmental process. Likewise, Klein
and Webster (2000) demonstrated that people high in
NFC processed a message systematically when heuristic
cues were not available. In a similar vein, Houghton
and Grewal (2000) showed that high levels of NFC led
to a less extensive information search in a consumer
choice paradigm, but only when participants had a
previously formed attitude about the product.
These studies demonstrate that NFC is associated
with applying previous knowledge, but only when
there is an initial, satisfactory basis for closure, result-
ing from familiarity with a subject or from having suf-
ficiently strong confidence in one’s initial opinion. If
people who are high in NFC lack a knowledge base on
which they can rely with relative confidence (e.g.,
when their self-view is threatened by experiences of
powerlessness, uncontrollability, or self-image threat)
they can desist from their default, heuristic, and sim-
plistic way of information processing and use a more
effortful and systematic one (e.g., Kossowska,
Bukowski, Guinote, Dragon, & Kruglanski, 2016; Kos-
sowska, Guinote, & Strojny, 2016 for a review see,
Roets et al., 2015). This means that individuals high in
NFC do not necessarily always have to be cognitive
misers, rigidly relying on what they already know. The
main motivation of people high in NFC is to reach clo-
sure, thus to reduce uncertainty (Kruglanski, 1989).
People high in NFC usually rely on pre-existing
knowledge structures that were tried and proven to be
useful in the past, as these means are associated with
greater expectancy of successful closure. However,
in situations when their trust in pre-existing knowl-
edge structures is undermined and the expectancy of
fulfilling the goal decreases, people high in NFC should
be more willing to search for alternative means for
achieving closure, and they should therefore consider
new strategies for doing so, even if they are more
effortful. This is consistent with the original formula-
tion of NFC theory (Kruglanski, 1989), where high
levels of the NFC are associated with the motivational
readiness to invest effort, rather than withdraw effort,
in order to attain the goal of certainty. In other words,
if necessary, people high in NFC can rise to the chal-
lenge posed by the environment, by adapting to the
unusual situation and by using more effortful means
in order to achieve their focal goal, that is to reduce
uncertainty.
In this article, we examine the link between NFC
and the application of compensatory rules, a link that
has yet to be tested. We assume that when two
groups are being compared, people high in NFC,
when provided with information consistent with their
previous knowledge about groups, will efficiently
apply compensatory rules. However, if exposed to
information that is distinct from, inconsistent with,
and even contradictory to their knowledge, they may
not apply routinized rules when forming impressions
about groups. Instead, they may attend to and exam-
ine more information. As a consequence of this, such
people may develop a more sophisticated perception
of the groups, instead of relying on simple compen-
satory perception. This is because exposure to infor-
mation that is strongly inconsistent with important
knowledge could reduce the expectancy of attaining
closure via typical means, that is, heuristics, schemas,
stereotypes, or—as in the case of the research
described in this article—compensatory rules. Thus,
we assume that when provided with stereotype-
inconsistent information, individuals high in NFC will
apply routinized heuristic tools to establish relation-
ships between social objects (i.e., compensatory rules)
to a lesser extent, as compared to when there is no
inconsistency.
Above we referred only to people high in NFC. This
is because we do not expect that people who are low
in NFC will be affected by the inconsistency manipula-
tion. This is because, by definition, people low in NFC
do not strive for predictability or order. On the con-
trary, they embrace ambiguity instead of certainty.
Also, as opposed to people who are high in NFC, peo-
ple who are low in NFC, as a default, process informa-
tion exhaustively, systematically, and effortfully, and
they rely on pre-existing knowledge structures to a
lesser extent than people who are high in NFC
(Kruglanski, 1989). Thus, we do not expect that when
experiencing inconsistency, people who are low in
NFC will change their default style of information pro-
cessing, as inconsistency does not pose a threat to
them, as it does in the case of people high in NFC.
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Overview of the Study
To test our hypotheses, we conducted three studies.
In Studies 1 and 2, we used a procedure similar to
that described by Kervyn et al. (2008) in which par-
ticipants evaluated two nationalities on the dimen-
sions of warmth and competence. The target
nationality was the nationality of the participants,
while the comparison nationalities were either low in
competence/high in warmth (Study 1), or high in
competence/low in warmth (Study 2). The compar-
ison groups were chosen on the basis of previous
research (CBOS, 2013; Dolinska & Fałkowski, 2011)
and their dimensional fit was additionally tested in a
pilot study (see Supporting Information). Moreover,
we provided participants with either expectancy-con-
sistent (Study 1) or expectancy-inconsistent (Study
2) information. In both studies, the manipulated
information referred to a national group’s position on
the dimension of warmth. In Study 3 we tested all
conditions in a single study by providing expectancy-
consistent information, expectancy-inconsistent infor-
mation, or no information at all (control condition).
In this study, we used a different group context:
Instead of national groups we used occupational
groups. Furthermore, instead of manipulating consis-
tency/inconsistency on the warmth dimension as in
Studies 1 and 2, we manipulated the dimension of
competence. This allowed us to test the generalizabil-
ity of the predicted effects in a different context.
Study 1
The aim of Study 1 was to test whether NFC predicts
the application of compensatory rules when forming
impressions about two groups. Participants evaluated
two nationalities on the dimensions of warmth and
competence. The target nationality was the nationality
of the participants: Polish. On the basis of previous
research (e.g., Dolinska & Fałkowski, 2011) and a pilot
study (see Supporting Information), Spaniards were
chosen as the comparison nationality that is stereotyp-
ically perceived in Poland to be warm but not compe-
tent. We assumed that when participants high (vs.
low) in NFC obtained expectancy-consistent informa-
tion (that a group stereotypically perceived as warm, is
in fact warm), as well as when they were in the
control condition in which they do not obtain
any expectancy-consistent nor expectancy-inconsistent
information, they would rely on their routinized com-
pensatory rules. As a consequence, the more partici-
pants who are high in NFC perceive Spaniards as being
warmer than Poles, the more they should perceive
Poles as being more competent than Spaniards.
Design and Participants
This study was a 2 (consistency manipulation: consis-
tency vs. control) between-subjects design. All
participants evaluated Spaniards and Poles on the
dimensions of warmth, competence, and morality. The
order of the presentation of a given nationality was
counterbalanced.
The experiment was conducted online. Eighty users1
of an online research panel took part in the study, but
nine of them failed to prove that they had familiarized
themselves with the experimental manipulation and
were thus excluded from further analyses. Thus, we
used data from 71 participants (32 in experimental
condition, 39 in the control condition; 52 women, 19
men; Mage = 27.31, SD = 8.27). They were compen-
sated three PLN (approximately one USD) for complet-
ing the questionnaire.
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed a short version of the Need for
Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). We used
the following subscales in our analysis: preference for
order and structure in the environment, predictability
of future contexts, and affective discomfort occasioned
by ambiguity. We removed the subscales closed-mind-
edness and decisiveness from analysis, as they were
not correlated with any other subscale.2 This is in line
with previous research establishing that the decisive-
ness subscale measures ability rather than motivation
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2007), and that the closed-minded-
ness subscale captures a different phenomenon (Neu-
berg & Newsom, 1993). The reliability of the scale was
a = .83. Items were averaged into an index of NFC
(M = 4.11; SD = 0.70). The higher the index, the
higher the score on NFC.
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of
two conditions: the experimental condition or the con-
trol condition. In both conditions, participants were
asked to carefully read the text presented to them. In
the experimental condition, participants read the fol-
lowing text:
‘The Eurobarometer is a representative survey of
public opinion, organized on behalf of the European
Commission. 40,000 citizens from all member coun-
tries of the European Union participated in the last
1We did not perform an a-priori power analysis before conducting
our studies. It was because studies were conducted four years ago,
when it was not yet a common research practice. Nevertheless, we
believe that despite this limitation—that we fully acknowledge—the
presented results are reliable. Obtained results are consistent across
three independent studies. Moreover, as a post-hoc power analysis is
generally not recommended (e.g., Hoenig & Heisey, 2001; Zumbo &
Hubley, 1998), in order to at least partially control for potential prob-
lems that conducted studies were underpowered, we performed a
meta-analysis (e.g., Cohn & Becker, 2003; Higgins & Green, 2011).
2Across all three studies reported in this article, closed-mindedness
and decisiveness subscales did not correlate with the other subscales
(preference for order and structure in the environment, predictability
of future contexts, and affective discomfort occasioned by ambiguity);
therefore in all experiments we used the NFC score based on the
three subscales.
European Journal of Social Psychology 49 (2019) 127–140 ª 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 129
P. Dragon & M. Kossowska Epistemic motivation and information consistency
survey about the “self-portraits” of Europeans. This
research investigated, among other issues, what the
citizens of European Union member countries think
about each other. In one of the questions, the
respondents were asked to choose “the most like-
able nationality in the European Union.” Respon-
dents could not vote for their own country (e.g.,
people from Poland could not vote for Poles, etc.).
The results of the study clearly ascertained that
among Europeans the most likeable nation in the
European Union are the Spanish (64% of respon-
dents voted for people from Spain, from among the
27 possible countries). The research in which you
are currently participating is an additional study of
the findings from the Eurobarometer, focusing on
two nationalities’.
In the control condition the text was exactly the
same; however, the underlined portion was removed.
Subsequently, participants evaluated people from
Spain and Poland on the dimensions of warmth, com-
petence, and morality. As researchers have argued that
morality is also an important dimension in impression
formation (e.g., Abele, Uchronski, Suitner, & Woj-
ciszke, 2008; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Wojciszke &
Abele, 2008), we controlled for its influence. The items
used in this study were: warm, friendly, helpful (for
warmth), competent, capable, intelligent (for compe-
tence), and moral, honest, good (for morality). Partici-
pants assessed these traits on a seven-point scale
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much). Being concerned
about the possible effects of social desirability and aim-
ing to capture broader societal perceptions, following
Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu (2002), indirect instruc-
tions were used. Participants were asked how the
groups are perceived by Polish society (“To what
extent, in your opinion, do people in Poland perceive
people from [Spain, Poland] as. . .”). Reliabilities for
the scales were: Spain warmth a = .88; Spain compe-
tence a = .83; Spain morality a = .84; Poland warmth
a = .85; Poland competence a = .86; Poland morality
a = .85. The items related to a given dimension were
averaged into a single index. The higher the index, the
higher the group was rated on a given dimension.
Afterwards, participants from the experimental con-
dition answered two questions on seven-point scales
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much) that assessed the effec-
tiveness of the manipulation (i.e., its consistency with
previous stereotypical knowledge). They were asked to
what extent the Eurobarometer findings about Spa-
niards were surprising and to what extent they were
expected. Participants then assessed their identification
with Poland on a seven-point scale, using a pictorial
measure similar to the method described by Swann,
Gomez, Seyle, Morales, and Huici (2009). Because one
of the evaluated groups was the national group of the
participants, their identification with the country
might affect the evaluations. Thus, we controlled for
the strength of identification in order to rule out its
influence (M = 4.21; SD = 1.72).
Finally, all participants answered two questions that
assessed whether they had read the cover story.
Because the study was conducted online, there was
limited control over the participants. Therefore, it was
important to incorporate an additional index that
would allow us to distinguish between reliable and
unreliable participants. All participants were asked
how many people took part in the Eurobarometer sur-
vey, and additionally, participants from the experi-
mental condition were asked which nationality was
reported to be the most likable in the survey. Nine par-
ticipants failed to answer these questions (eight from
the experimental condition, and one from the control
condition), and were excluded from further analyses.
All of these participants also spent a significantly lower
amount of time completing the survey, as compared to
the average (nine minutes). Thus, we used data from
71 participants. After completing the questionnaire,
participants were debriefed.
In order to observe whether the compensatory rules
were applied, we calculated the indexes of the differ-
entiation between groups3 (Kervyn et al., 2009). The
index of the differentiation between the groups on the
warmth dimension was calculated as the mean evalua-
tion of Poles subtracted from the mean evaluation of
Spaniards. The index of the differentiation between
the groups on the dimension of competence was cal-
culated as the mean evaluation of Spaniards sub-
tracted from the mean evaluation of Poles on this
dimension. Thus, for the dimension of warmth, posi-
tive values of the differentiation index indicate that
Spaniards were evaluated as being warmer than Poles,
while for the competence dimension, positive values
mean that Poles were evaluated as being more compe-
tent than Spaniards. A positive relation between these
two indexes would indicate that the compensatory
rules had been applied (the more one group was per-
ceived as being higher on one dimension, the more
the second group was perceived as being higher on the
other dimension). The mean values for these indexes
were: for differentiation on the dimension of warmth
(M = 1.31; SD = 1.27), and for differentiation on the
competence dimension (M = 0.48; SD = 1.51).
3We used difference scores, as it is a way to evaluate compensatory
perception at an individual level, when comparison context is
involved (two groups are evaluated). As has been shown in previous
research on compensatory perception, in comparative context the
mutual position of two groups on one dimension (e.g., one group
being perceived as more competent than the other) affects perception
of these groups on a second dimension (the group being perceived as
less competent is also perceived as being higher on warmth dimen-
sion) (e.g., Kervyn, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2009). Therefore, it has to be
taken into consideration when analyzing results, and the way to
achieve it is to analyze difference scores. In this way, it is possible to
evaluate the degree to which participants differentiate between
groups on a given dimension (whether they in fact perceive a given
group as being higher on a given dimension as compared to the other
group, e.g., Spaniards as being more warm than Poles) and how
it is related to the mutual position of these groups on the other
dimension.
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We predicted that in both conditions, that is, when
provided with information that is consistent with pre-
vious knowledge (consistency condition) or not pro-
vided with any information about the group (control
condition), people high in NFC would apply the com-
pensatory rules to a greater extent than people low in
NFC. We did not expect any differences between the
experimental and control conditions, because in both
situations, the information given does not violate pre-
existing knowledge, thus participants should act based
on their preferred processing mode. We expected an
interaction between the predictor measure (the differ-
entiation between Spaniards and Poles on the dimen-
sion of warmth) and NFC, on the dependent variable
(the differentiation between Poles and Spaniards on
the competence dimension). In addition, we con-
trolled for the evaluations on the morality dimension
and the strength of participants’ identification with
their Polish nationality.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. As predicted, the informa-
tion about the high ratings of the Spanish nation on
the dimension of warmth was statistically significantly
more expected (M = 5.03; SD = 1.60) than surpris-
ing (M = 2.69; SD = 1.58), t(31) = 4.48, p < .001, d =
1.47.4 This means that participants perceived the infor-
mation provided in the manipulation as being consis-
tent with their previous knowledge; thus the
manipulation induced the experience of consistency.
Need for closure and the application of com-
pensatory rules. In order to test our hypotheses, a
regression analysis was performed. We tested the full
model with all of the variables listed above included in
the model: evaluations of Poles and Spaniards on the
morality dimension, strength of participants’ identifica-
tion with their Polish nationality, all the main effects,
the two-way interaction combinations, and a three-
way interaction between predictor (the differentiation
between Spaniards and Poles on the dimension of
warmth) and two moderators (i.e., NFC and the
dummy coded conditions: 0 control/1 consistency con-
dition). The DV was the differentiation between Poles
and Spaniards on the competence dimension. All con-
tinuous variables were standardized before the analy-
sis. In this and all analyses in this and the following
studies, reported coefficients and confidence intervals
refer to standardized coefficients. The whole model
was significant, F(10, 59) = 3.16, p = .003, R2 = .35.
The moral evaluation of Poles (b = .43; t = 3.51,
p = .001, 95% CI [0.19, 0.68]) and the moral evalua-
tion of Spaniards (b = .32; t = 2.74, p = .008, 95% CI
[0.55, 0.09]) turned out to be significant. Also, the
main effects of the warmth differentiation index
(b = .36; t = 1.78, p = .082, 95% CI [0.05, 0.77]) and
the strength of identification (b = .23; t = 1.90,
p = .062, 95% CI [0.01, 0.47]) were marginally non-
significant. As predicted, the three-way interaction was
not statistically significant (b = .41; t = 1.64,
p = .106, 95% CI [0.91, 0.09]), and the interaction
term between NFC and the warmth differentiation
index was significant (b = .49; t = 2.37, p = .021,
R2 = .06, 95% CI [0.08, 0.90]). The interaction is
depicted in Figure 1. To probe for a significant interac-
tion, we used a simple slope analysis and calculated the
effect of our predictor on our DV at low (1 SD) and
high (+1 SD) values of the moderator (NFC). A simple
slope analysis indicated a positive relation between the
warmth differentiation index (predictor), and the com-
petence differentiation index (DV) among high NFC
participants (b = .85; t = 2.40, p = .020, 95% CI [0.14,
1.56]), but not among low NFC participants (b = .13;
t = .61, p = .544, 95% CI [0.54, 0.29]).
In sum, the more people high in NFC differentiated
between people from Spain and Poland on the dimen-
sion of warmth (i.e., the higher Spaniards were evalu-
ated on the dimension of warmth as compared to
Poles), the more they differentiated between them on
the dimension of competence in the opposite direction
(i.e., the higher Poles were evaluated on dimension of
competence as compared to Spaniards). Thus, in line
with expectations, this reveals that people high (vs.
low) in NFC applied the compensatory rules when
evaluating two groups in a comparative context. This
effect occurred when no information about Spaniards
was provided, but also when participants were pro-
vided with expectancy-consistent information. This
shows that when there is no inconsistency with one’s
previous beliefs, people high in NFC apply routinized
rules to resolve the task, while people low in NFC do
not rely on these rules as heavily.
Fig. 1: Regression lines demonstrate application of the compensatory
rule (differentiation between Poles and Spanish people on the dimen-
sion of competence, as a function of differentiation between these
groups on dimension of warmth) and need for closure (NFC)
4Manipulation checks in all conducted studies were performed only
in experimental conditions, and degrees of freedom correspond to
number of participants in experimental conditions.
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Study 2
The aim of Study 2 was to test whether, relative to the
control condition, expectancy-inconsistent informa-
tion provided to participants leads to lower reliance on
compensatory rules among people high (vs. low) in
NFC. As in Study 1, participants evaluated two nation-
alities on the dimensions of warmth and competence.
The target nationality was the nationality of the partic-
ipants (Poles). On the basis of previous research (e.g.,
Dolinska & Fałkowski, 2011), Germans were chosen as
the comparison nationality perceived in Poland as
being competent and cold. In Study 2, instead of pro-
viding information consistent with previous knowl-
edge, inconsistent information was provided. We
assumed that in the control condition (when no infor-
mation regarding Germans is provided), participants
high in NFC would apply the compensatory rules to
a greater extent than participants low in NFC (as in
Study 1). As a consequence, the more participants
high in NFC perceive Germans as being more compe-
tent than Poles, the more they should perceive Poles
as being warmer than Germans. However, in the
experimental condition the experience of inconsis-
tency should discourage participants high in NFC from
using their routinized rules; thus this effect should
disappear.
Design and Participants
This study was a 2 (consistency manipulation: incon-
sistency vs. control) between-subjects design. All par-
ticipants evaluated people from Germany and Poland
on the dimensions of warmth, competence, and
morality. The order of the presentation of a given
nationality was counterbalanced.
The study was conducted online, using an online
research panel. Sixty-six participants took part in the
study. Ten participants failed to prove that they had
familiarized themselves with the experimental manip-
ulation and were therefore excluded from further
analyses. Thus, we used data from 56 participants (28
in the experimental condition, 28 in the control condi-
tion; 38 women, 18 men; Mage = 28.07, SD = 8.97).
Participants received three PLN (approximately one
USD) for completing the questionnaire.
Materials and Procedure
All the materials were exactly the same as in Study 1
(except the experimental manipulation), and were
presented in the same order. Firstly, participants com-
pleted a short version of the NFC Scale. As before,
three subscales were used in the analyses (Cronbach’s
a = .81). Items were averaged into an index of NFC;
the higher the score, the higher the levels of NFC
(M = 4.18; SD = 0.62). Secondly, participants were
randomly assigned to either the experimental or the
control condition. The manipulation was identical to
that in Study 1, only in the experimental condition
people read that the most likeable nation in the Euro-
pean Union are the Germans.
Subsequently, participants evaluated Germans and
Poles on warmth, competence, and morality, using the
same items as in Study 1. Reliabilities for the scales
were as follows: Germans’ warmth a = .86; Germans’
competence a = .85; Germans’ morality a = .81; Poles’
warmth a = .79; Poles’ competence a = .86; Poles’
morality a = .86. Items related to a given dimension
were averaged into a single index. As in Study 1, par-
ticipants in the experimental condition then answered
two questions assessing the effectiveness of the manip-
ulation, that is, its inconsistency with previous (stereo-
typical) knowledge. We asked to what extent the
results of the Eurobarometer were surprising and to
what extent they were expected.
Participants then assessed their identification with
their country (Poland) (M = 4.16; SD = 1.54) using
the same method as in Study 1, and they answered
two questions assessing whether they had read the
manipulation. Ten participants failed to answer these
questions correctly (four from the experimental condi-
tion, and six from the control condition), and were
excluded from further analyses. Thus, we used data
from 56 participants. After completing the question-
naire, participants were debriefed.
As in Study 1, the application of compensatory rules
was assessed by using indices of the differentiation
between groups on a given dimension. For the
warmth dimension we subtracted the mean evaluation
of Germans from the mean evaluation of Poles, and
for the competence dimension we subtracted the
mean evaluation of Poles from the mean evaluation of
Germans on this dimension. As Germans are stereo-
typically perceived as being competent and cold, in
order to obtain indices comparable to those in Study 1
(i.e., a positive value of the index indicating that one
group is stereotypically perceived as being higher on
the dimension than the second group), the sequence
of subtraction was reversed. Thus, for the competence
dimension, a positive value indicates that Germans
were evaluated as being higher on competence than
Poles, while for the warmth dimension, a positive
value of the differentiation index indicates that Poles
were evaluated as being higher on warmth than Ger-
mans. A positive relation between these two indexes
indicates the application of the compensatory rules.
The mean values for these indices were as follows: for
the differentiation on the dimension of warmth
(M = 1.20; SD = 1.32), and for the differentiation on
the dimension of competence (M = 0.58; SD = 1.41).
We expected that in the control condition, people
high (but not low) in NFC should apply the compen-
satory rules, while in the experimental condition (in-
consistency condition) this effect should disappear
among participants high in NFC. Thus, in this study
we expected a three-way interaction (predic-
tor 9 NFC 9 experimental condition) to be statisti-
cally significant. The dependent variable was the
differentiation on the warmth dimension, and the
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predictor variable was the differentiation on the com-
petence dimension (the dimension on which Germans
are perceived as being higher than Poles). Also, as
before, we controlled for moral evaluations and the
strength of national identification (with Poland).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. As predicted, the informa-
tion about the high position of Germans on the
dimension of warmth was significantly more surpris-
ing (M = 5.07; SD = 1.36) than expected (M = 3.07;
SD = 1.36), t(27) = 4.05, p < .001, d = 1.47. This indi-
cates that participants perceived the information pro-
vided as inconsistent with their previous knowledge;
thus the manipulation was successful and induced the
experience of inconsistency.
Need for closure and the application of com-
pensatory rules. As in Study 1, a regression analysis
was performed. Once again, we tested the full model
with all the variables listed above included in the
model: evaluation of Poles and Germans on the
dimension of morality, the strength of national identi-
fication, all the main effects, the two-way interaction
combinations, and a three-way interaction between
predictor (the differentiation between Germans and
Poles on the dimension of competence) and two mod-
erators (i.e., NFC and dummy coded experimental
condition: 0 control/1 inconsistency condition). The
DV was the differentiation between Poles and Ger-
mans on the warmth dimension. All variables were
standardized before the analysis. The model was signif-
icant, F(10, 45) = 4.59, p < .001, R2 = .51. Morality
evaluations of both Poles (b = .46; t = 3.28, p = .001,
95% CI [0.18, 0.75]) and Germans (b = .43;
t = 3.75, p = .002, 95% CI [0.67, 0.20]) were sta-
tistically significant, as was the interaction between
the index of competence differentiation and NFC
(b = .46; t = 2.29, p = .027, 95% CI [0.06, 0.89]). As
predicted, a three-way interaction between NFC, con-
dition, and the competence differentiation index (pre-
dictor) was statistically significant (b = .74; t = 3.09,
p = .003, R2 = .11, 95% CI [1.23, 0.26]). The inter-
action is depicted in Figure 2.
To probe for a significant interaction, we used a sim-
ple slope analysis and calculated the effect of our pre-
dictor on our DV at low (1 SD) and high (+1 SD)
values of the first moderator (NFC), at values of a sec-
ond moderator (dummy coded experimental condi-
tion). A simple slope analysis indicated that in the
control condition, a positive relation between the
competence differentiation index (predictor) and the
warmth differentiation index (DV) appeared among
participants high in NFC (b = .85; t = 2.42, p = .020,
95% CI [0.14, 1.55]), but not among participants low
in NFC (b = .10; t = .39, p = .696, 95% CI [0.64,
0.43]). In the experimental condition, we found a pos-
itive, although non-significant, relation between the
competence differentiation index and the warmth dif-
ferentiation index among participants low in NFC
(b = .21; t = 1.08, p = .285, 95% CI [0.18, 0.60]),
but it was negative and non-significant among partici-
pants high in NFC (b = .32; t = 1.87, p = .069, 95%
CI [0.67, 0.03]).
In sum, in the control condition, the more people
high in NFC differentiated between Germans and Poles
on the dimension of competence (the higher Germans
were evaluated on the dimension of competence rela-
tive to Poles), the more they differentiated between
them on the dimension of warmth in the opposite
direction (the higher Poles were evaluated on the
dimension of warmth relative to Germans). Thus, in
line with expectations, this reveals that people high
(vs. low) in NFC apply the compensatory rules when
evaluating two groups in a comparative context, but
this effect occurred only in the condition where no
information about Germans was provided (control
condition). When expectancy-inconsistent informa-
tion was provided, people both high and low in NFC
did not apply previously learned rules to resolve the
task. This is in line with our assumption that, when
confronted with inconsistent information, people high
in NFC become less confident that their knowledge is
accurate and reliable and as a result they deviate from
relying on accessible knowledge structures. Thus, they
Fig. 2: Regression lines demonstrate application of the compensatory rule (the differentiation between Poles and Germans on the dimension of
warmth, as a function of differentiation between these groups on dimension of competence), need for closure (NFC), and experimental condition
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become more sensitive to non-stereotypical informa-
tion that in consequence serves them as a basis for
intergroup evaluations.
In Studies 1 and 2, the comparison groups were
national groups, and the manipulation referred to the
dimension of warmth. Moreover, participants belonged
to one of the two evaluated groups. Thus, while we
controlled for the strength of identification with the
ingroup, it could be argued that some sort of ingroup
processes might be affecting the evaluations. Thus, in
order to show that the effect is not specific to the con-
text used in Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3 we changed the
group context, as well as the manipulated dimension.
Study 3
In Study 3, we provided control, expectancy-inconsis-
tency, and expectancy-consistency conditions. We
manipulated the dimension of competence, instead of
warmth as in the previous experiments. Also, instead of
national groups (including the participants’ ingroup),
occupational groups were used. This allows us to test
the generalizability of the predicted effects in a different
social context. We also tested whether changes in the
perceptions of a given group on one dimension (e.g., as
the result of an anti-stereotype intervention) could
change the evaluation of the second group in the oppo-
site direction on the second dimension. In that way, we
investigated not only whether the compensatory rules
were applied but also whether inconsistency may
change intergroup perception.
Thus, this was a repeated measure experiment,5 in
which we measured the evaluations of two groups
(pretest), then participants obtained information
consistent or inconsistent with stereotypical knowl-
edge (experimental conditions) or no information
(control condition), and again they evaluated these
groups (posttest).
Design and Participants
This study has a mixed between-within subjects
design, with one within-subjects variable: the evalua-
tion moment (before the manipulation vs. after the
manipulation), and one between-subjects variable: the
consistency manipulation (consistency vs. inconsis-
tency vs. control). All participants evaluated two
groups (business school students and culinary school
students) on the dimensions of warmth, competence,
and morality, before and after the manipulation. The
order of the presentation of a given group was coun-
terbalanced.
In total, 105 high school students (34 in the consis-
tency condition, 37 in the inconsistency condition, 34
in the control condition; 65 women, 40 men;
Mage = 17.37; SD = 0.55), from six classes participated
in the study. Classes were randomly assigned to one of
three between-subjects conditions.
Materials and Procedure
An experimenter explained to the students that the
study consists of two parts. In the first part, partici-
pants evaluated two groups on warmth, competence
and morality, using the same items as in the previous
studies. The first target group was a group perceived
as being warm and incompetent (culinary school stu-
dents), while the second group was a group per-
ceived as being competent and cold (business school
students). As in the previous studies, items related to
a given dimension were averaged into a single index.
The reliabilities for the resulting scales were as fol-
lows: culinary school warmth a = .89; culinary
school competence a = .86; culinary school morality
a = .82; business school warmth a = .86; business
school competence a = .81; business school morality
a = .84.
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants completed a short
version of the NFC Scale. The same three subscales as
in the previous experiments were used in further anal-
yses. The items were averaged into a single index of
NFC (M = 3.93; SD = 0.70), which formed a reliable
scale, a = .74.
Finally, in order to create a reliable comparison con-
text, participants completed a bogus intelligence test.
To maximize the perceived relevance of the test, the
experimenter emphasized that the test was well vali-
dated on a sample of more than 100,000 individuals,
that this version was designed especially for high
school students, and that the results were highly pre-
dictive of high school completion, future academic
performance, and employment prospects. The test was
comprised of seven tasks (similar to Raven’s Matrices),
and participants had 7 minutes to solve them. After
5Moreover, because it was not certain whether the perception of a
group can be changed simply by obtaining information inconsistent
with previous knowledge, we included an additional manipulation. In
two conditions, participants obtained information consistent/inconsis-
tent with stereotypical knowledge (that a given group scored very
high on an intelligence test), and in two conditions in addition partici-
pants were informed that their own group scored poorly on this test.
We assumed, that obtaining information that not only the group per-
ceived as being stereotypically incompetent had scored high on intelli-
gence test, but also that the participants’ own group had scored poorly
may additionally strengthen the manipulated experience of inconsis-
tency. In every analysis described in this study we controlled for the
influence of this additional manipulation, although it turned out there
was no significant effect associated with this manipulation; therefore
for the clarity of reasoning and presentation we do not describe it later
on. But because of this additional manipulation, participants
answered also to an Importance to Identity subscale from the Collec-
tive Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). This subscale was
used to control for the strength of participants’ identification with
their school class, which can affect the evaluations of the participants.
This subscale consisted of four items (e.g., “The school class I belong
to is an important reflection of who I am.”), on which participants
answered using a seven-point scale (1 = completely disagree;
7 = completely agree). The scale was reliable, a = .79. Items were
summed into an index (M = 15.51; SD = 4.32). In the analyses we
controlled for this variable but it did not reveal any significant results.
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completing the test, participants were informed that
they would be receiving the results a week later when
taking part in the next step of the study.
In the second part of the study, which took place
a week later, we introduced the manipulation. At
the start of this part an experimenter informed the
participants that he did not have enough time to
prepare individual feedback on the previous intelli-
gence test. In all conditions, except the control con-
dition, participants were told that although they
would not be receiving their individual results, they
would receive information about the average results
from various high schools where the same test was
recently administered. They were also informed that
the test was highly valid and reliable. In the incon-
sistency condition, participants were informed that
culinary high school students (a group stereotypi-
cally perceived as being warm but incompetent)
scored very high on the test. In the consistency con-
dition, participants were informed that business
school students (a group stereotypically perceived as
being cold but competent) had scored very high on
the test.
Subsequently, participants once again evaluated
business school students and culinary school students
on the same items as in the first part of the study.
Then, participants from the experimental conditions
(consistency and inconsistency) answered two ques-
tions (on a seven-point scale) assessing the effective-
ness of the manipulation; namely, the extent to which
the results of culinary school and business school stu-
dents were surprising and to what extent they were
expected. Finally, participants were debriefed. The
experimenter made sure that the participants under-
stood that the received feedback regarding the test
results was bogus and that the test itself did not mea-
sure intelligence.
We assessed change in the perception of culinary
school students on the dimension of warmth (predic-
tor), and change in the perception of business school
students on the dimension of competence (dependent
variable). Thus, the compensatory rules application
was indicated by a positive relationship between the
change in the perception of one group on one
dimension (culinary school students being perceived
as warmer after the manipulation, as compared to
before the manipulation), and the change in the per-
ception of the other group on the other dimension
(business school students being perceived as more
competent after the manipulation, as compared to
before the manipulation). We assumed that in the
control condition (when no information regarding
the evaluated groups was provided), and in the con-
sistency condition, the compensatory rules would be
applied by participants high but not low in NFC (sim-
ilar to Study 1). We also assumed that this effect
would disappear among high NFC participants when
expectancy-inconsistent information was provided
(similar to Study 2).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation check. In order to test whether the
information regarding the high score of culinary
school students on the dimension of competence was
surprising for participants, and thus inconsistent with
their expectations, an ANOVA was conducted with
one within-subjects variable: expectation (expected vs.
surprising), and one between-subjects variable: consis-
tency manipulation (consistency vs. inconsistency).
Only the interaction term between the consistency
manipulation and expectation reached significance, F
(1, 67) = 8.63, p < .005, g2 = .11. Specific comparisons
showed, as predicted, that the information given was
more surprising (M = 4.59, SD = 1.40) than expected
(M = 3.26, SD = 1.42), when it referred to culinary
school students, t(33) = 2.98, p = .003, d = 0.94.
When it referred to business school students it was
more expected (M = 4.11, SD = 1.65) than surprising
(M = 3.49, SD = 1.73), although the difference was
not statistically significant, t(36) = 1.25, p = .099,
d = 0.37. This indicates that the manipulation was
effective, because in the inconsistency condition par-
ticipants perceived the information provided as being
inconsistent with their previous knowledge, while in
the consistency condition they perceived it as being
consistent with that knowledge (or at least as not
being inconsistent).
Need for closure and the application of
compensatory rules. First, we calculated the indices
of change in the perception of both groups on warmth,
competence, and morality. We subtracted the first
evaluation (before the manipulation) of a group on a
given dimension from the second evaluation (after the
manipulation). Thus, positive values of the indices
indicate that a given group was perceived as being
higher on a given dimension in the second evaluation,
as compared to the first one. This gives six indexes of
change: (3) change in the perception on (warmth vs.
competence vs. morality) 9 (2) group (business school
students vs. culinary school students). To test our
hypotheses, we performed regression analyses with
the change index of the competence dimension of stu-
dents from business school as a dependent variable,
the change index of the warmth dimension of the
assessment of students from the culinary school as a
predictor, and NFC and the experimental conditions as
moderators. As in the previously described studies, we
tested the full model with all main effects, two-way
interaction combinations, and a three-way interaction
between predictor and two moderators. Moreover, we
controlled for the remaining four change indices: the
change index in the evaluation of culinary school stu-
dents on morality, the change index in the evaluation
of business school students on morality, the change
index in the evaluation of culinary school students on
competence, and the change index in the evaluation
of business school students on warmth. Before
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computing the interaction terms, the variable identify-
ing the conditions was dummy coded, and all continu-
ous variables were standardized. A positive
relationship between the predictor and the DV indi-
cates the application of the compensatory rules (the
more culinary school students were perceived as war-
mer in the posttest, relative to the pretest, the more
business school students should be perceived as more
competent in posttest, relative to the pretest).
Firstly, we compared the condition of inconsistency
and the control condition (coded as 0 control/1 incon-
sistency condition). We expected a significant three-
way interaction, as the pattern for individuals high in
NFC should differ between these conditions. The
model was significant, F(13, 49) = 3.00, p = .003,
R2 = .44. The change score on the warmth dimension
for business school students (b = .30; t = 2.13,
p = .038, 95% CI [0.02, 0.59]) was statistically signifi-
cant. The three-way interaction between NFC, condi-
tion, and the predictor (change score on the dimension
of warmth for culinary school students) did not reach
the level of significance (b = .93; t = 1.89, p = .065,
R2 = .04, 95% CI [1.93, 0.06]). Although the interac-
tion was not statistically significant at level of p < .05,
we decided to check whether the predicted pattern
occurred. The interaction is depicted in Figure 3.
To probe for this interaction, we used a simple slope
analysis and calculated the effect of our predictor on
our DV at low (1 SD) and high (+1 SD) values of the
first moderator (NFC), at values of a second moderator
(dummy-coded experimental condition). Simple slope
analysis showed that in the control condition, a posi-
tive relationship between predictor and dependent
variable appeared among participants high in NFC
(b = .84; t = 1.83, p = .059, 95% CI [0.03, 1.72]),
but not among participants low in NFC (b = .904;
t = 1.58, p = .120, 95% CI [2.05, 0.25]). As in Study
2, in the inconsistent information condition, this pat-
tern changed for participants high in NFC (b = .23;
t = .56, p = .578, 95% CI [1.07, 0.60]), but for par-
ticipants low in NFC it remained the same (b = .11;
t = .67, p = .506, 95% CI [0.45, 0.22]).
We also performed comparisons of the difference
between slope coefficients (Cohen, Cohen, West, &
Aiken, 2003). As predicted, the compensatory rules
application was stronger among people high in NFC
when they did not experience inconsistency, as com-
pared to the situation when they experienced incon-
sistency (Z = 1.79; p = .040); and remained the same
for people low in NFC (Z = 1.33; p = .19).
Secondly, we compared the conditions of consis-
tency and control (coded as 0 control/1 consistency
condition). We did not expect any differences between
these conditions (as in Study 1); rather, we predicted
that only the interaction between the change in the
perception of the warmth of culinary school students
(predictor) and NFC would be statistically significant.
The model was non-significant, F(13, 48) = 1.86,
p = .060, R2 = .34. The change score on the compe-
tence dimension for culinary school students (b = .36;
t = 2.57, p = .013, 95% CI [0.08, 0.64]) and a two-way
interaction between change score on the dimension of
warmth for culinary school students and NFC were
statistically significant (b = .84; t = 2.47, p = .017,
R2 = .08, 95% CI [0.16, 1.52]). The interaction is pre-
sented in Figure 4. Simple slope analysis showed that,
again as predicted, irrespective of condition, a positive
relationship between predictor and dependent variable
appeared among participants high in NFC (b = .90;
t = 3.09, p = .003, 95% CI [0.31, 1.48]), while among
participants low in NFC this relation was negative
(b = .78; t = 2.69, p = .01, 95% CI [1.36,0.20]).
In sum, in this study we once again demonstrated
that participants high (vs. low) in NFC apply the com-
pensatory rules, here indicated by a positive relationship
between change in the perception of one group on one
dimension (culinary school students being perceived as
warm), and change in the perception of other group on
the opposite dimension (business school students being
perceived as competent), when the information pro-
vided about the group did not violate participants’ pre-
existing, stereotypical knowledge. However, when
confronted with expectancy-inconsistent information,
participants high in NFC deviated from these rules. As
Fig. 3: Regression lines show application of the compensatory rule: change in the perception of business school students on competence dimen-
sion (evaluation in pretest subtracted from evaluation in posttest), as a function of change in the perception of culinary school students on
warmth dimension (evaluation in pretest subtracted from evaluation in posttest), need for closure (NFC), and experimental condition
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compared to Studies 1 and 2, in this study we captured
the more complex and more dynamic nature of the
compensatory rules application: How the changing
perception of one group affected change in the percep-
tion of the other group.
Meta-analysis
Given that in each study we used the same manipula-
tion and that in all studies we aimed to capture the
same phenomenon, that is the application of the com-
pensatory rules, we report the integrated results using
a meta-analysis of the three experiments (Cumming,
2014). The meta-analysis was conducted using Com-
prehensive Meta-Analysis Software, on standardized
regression coefficients and its standard errors. The
analysis was performed on values of regression coeffi-
cients for the predictor, obtained from a simple slope
analysis of interaction terms. We analyzed data from
three studies, divided into four within study sub-
groups: 2 (NFC: high vs. low) 9 2 (consistency manip-
ulation: consistency vs. inconsistency). We used the
random-effects model, as it is appropriate and more
realistic in this case (Schmidt, Oh, & Hayes, 2009). The
calculated effect sizes and confidence intervals are
reported in Figure 5.
As predicted, the analysis indicated that the com-
pensatory rules were applied only among people high
in NFC when there was no inconsistency (0.85,
p < .001, 95% CI[0.41, 1.28]), while in the remaining
groups the effect did not differ significantly from zero,
that is for high NFC and inconsistency (0.31,
p = .063, 95% CI[0.63, 0.02]), low NFC and consis-
tency (0.18, p = .269, 95% CI[0.49, 0.14]), low
NFC and inconsistency (0.03, p = .832, 95% CI[0.28,
0.35]). The results of this meta-analysis support our
prediction that when facing inconsistency, people high
in NFC do not apply heuristic tools to establish a rela-
tionship between social objects, but they do apply
them (here in the form of compensatory rules) when
there is no inconsistency involved.
General Discussion
When operating in familiar situations, people moti-
vated to achieve closure process information based on
existing perceptual schemas that efficiently guide
interpretation and responses (for an overview, see
Roets et al., 2015). Previous studies on the motivation
toward closure have focused mainly on stereotypes,
overgeneralized beliefs about members of a group that
provide people high in NFC with “quick judgments
about members of a stereotyped category”, thus reduc-
ing uncertainty (Kruglanski et al., 2009). In our study,
we demonstrated that the compensatory rules may
also be a powerful cognitive tool that organizes and
simplifies social perception, thus allowing one to reach
epistemic goals. When two groups are evaluated, the
application of the simple compensatory rules “if warm,
then incompetent” and “if cold, then competent”
results in perceiving one group as being higher on one
dimension, and the other group as being higher on the
other dimension. The application of these compen-
satory rules is a cognitive tool that allows one to
achieve a quick and easy solution to the complex task
of evaluating social objects on two fundamental
dimensions of social perception. Thus, it should be
especially useful for people who search for order and
predictability. In three studies, we demonstrated that
people high in NFC applied these compensatory rules
to evaluate two different groups to a greater extent
than did people who did not have this motivation (i.e.,
those low in NFC).
There are studies showing that stereotypes, atti-
tudes, and judgments will likely persist as long as the
individual continues to perceive targets in a relatively
stable frame of reference (Newcomb, 1950). However,
when the unexpected occurs, or when exposed to
unfamiliar contexts such as counter-stereotypical
information, automatic processing becomes insuffi-
cient and people rely on it to a lesser extent (e.g.,
Fig. 5: Meta-analysis of three current studies. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonli-
nelibrary.com]
Fig. 4: Regression lines show application of the compensatory rule:
change in the perception of business school students on competence
dimension (evaluation in pretest subtracted from evaluation in postt-
est), as a function of change in the perception of culinary school stu-
dents on warmth dimension (evaluation in pretest subtracted from
evaluation in posttest), and need for closure (NFC), in consistency
and control conditions
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Louis & Sutton, 1991). In such circumstances, in order
to make sense of their new experiences, people may
deviate from their default cognitive patterns and begin
to notice things they would normally have filtered out
(Kossowska, Dragon, & Bukowski, 2015; Louis & Sut-
ton, 1991; Tadmor, Hong, Chao, Wiruchnipawan, &
Wang, 2012). In this article, we suggest that expec-
tancy-inconsistent information provided to partici-
pants may lead those high in NFC to deviate from the
application of compensatory rules, and that this in
turn influences their social perception. In all three
studies we demonstrated that, when provided with
expectancy-consistent information (or in the control
condition where no expectation-violating information
was provided), people high in NFC applied the com-
pensatory rules to evaluate two different groups to a
greater extent than did people low in NFC. However,
when individuals high in NFC were provided with
information that was expectancy-inconsistent, these
effects disappeared. These results are in line with
research showing that inconsistency between pre-
existing knowledge structures and information from
the environment (e.g., about one’s competence,
morality, power position, or the uncontrollability of
expected outcomes) leads people to employ stereotypi-
cal information less as a means to form impressions
about target groups (e.g., Kossowska et al., 2015; Kos-
sowska, Bukowski, et al., 2016; Kossowska, Guinote,
& Strojny, 2016; Rios, Markman, Schroeder, & Dyc-
zewski, 2014; Tadmor et al., 2012).
Consistency theories and social cognition research
argue that expectancy-inconsistent information dis-
rupts the fluency of information processing (Rubin,
Paolini, & Crisp, 2013), can be experienced as threat-
ening, and evokes uncertainty about one’s own judg-
ments (Kossowska et al., 2015). We suggest that the
feeling of inconsistency may serve as a signal that
existing scripts, rules, and other knowledge structures
no longer provide guidance on how to act and that
they therefore no longer afford a sense of predictability
(Ruble, 1994). Further, we claim that inconsistency
between previous knowledge and information pro-
vided undermines individuals’ confidence in their
judgmental competence; thus, lessening their reliance
on habitual modes of judgment based on compen-
satory rules. As we have seen, inconsistency affected
people high in NFC but not those who were low in
NFC. We assume that this is because inconsistency
increases the motivation to resolve this inconsistency
only among those individuals for whom uncertainty is
incompatible with their focal goal, and who are there-
fore willing to invest effort in changing their default
way of information processing, namely people who
are high in NFC. In other words, the greater the goal
importance (achieving certainty), the greater the like-
lihood that people will select the most instrumental
means, even if they pose considerable demands. As a
consequence, people high in NFC who are confronted
with expectancy-inconsistent information withdraw
from their usual means of achieving closure (i.e.,
relying on pre-existing knowledge) and attend to, and
examine more, information about groups, and ulti-
mately develop more balanced perceptions of groups.
Of course, more research is necessary to establish
whether our explanation of this process is valid, and
what exactly occurs when people experience inconsis-
tency. Our explanation of this mechanism is only one
out of many possible alternatives. For example, it is
possible that the experience of inconsistency affects a
task’s perceived characteristics (the task is perceived as
being more demanding), and as a consequence, more
effort has to be invested in the task. There is also a
question regarding the adaptive value of the change in
the behavior of people high in NFC. Is this change a
strategic response that is made in order to resolve
inconsistency, or does the experience of inconsistency
simply disorganize the person’s regular way of process-
ing information? Future studies should focus more on
testing the mechanism responsible for our findings.
Our study also advances NFC theory. The bulk of
NFC research has demonstrated that NFC is linked to a
preference for a heuristic processing style (for an over-
view, see Roets et al., 2015). In our opinion, this is
unfortunate because it confuses the goal with the
means of achieving it. People high in NFC are moti-
vated to achieve the goal of certainty. It just happens
that knowledge structures and information processing
strategies that are constant, universal, and easy to gen-
eralize across different situations are also heuristical,
simplistic, and effortless. However, this does not neces-
sarily mean that people high in NFC use these means
because they are simplistic. In our opinion they use
these means because they are effective tools that allow
them to achieve their goal of certainty across many
different situations. However, if the situation is per-
ceived to be non-typical, or when the task at hand
demands it, people high in NFC are willing to change
their preferred means of achieving certainty, which
leads to systematic processing (Jasko, Czernatowicz-
Kukuczka, Kossowska, & Czarna, 2015; Klein & Web-
ster, 2000; Kossowska et al., 2015; Kruglanski et al.,
1991; Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; Van Hiel &
Mervielde, 2002). In other words, people who are high
in NFC would sometimes choose the quickest and pro-
ven way to attain closure, which is usually also heuris-
tical and simplistic. However, if this route is made
unavailable or unreliable, they are willing to use more
systematic processing to attain closure. We would like
to challenge the current distinction in existing litera-
ture on how high versus low NFC individuals process
information, wherein it is in fact possible that high
NFC individuals need not always take on the role of a
cognitive miser to make decisions.
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